guards to prepare them for their new responsibilities.
Assessment:
The volume of alarm-related police calls for service dropped by 90 percent during the first nine months the verified response ordinance was in effect, compared to the same time frame one year prior. Average private guard response times to alarm activations has been much faster than the previous average police response times. Average police response time to other high priority calls for service dropped from five to three minutes. There has been no increase in the number of reported burglaries and the apprehension rate of burglars caught on site actually increased. Revenues for alarm companies and private guard companies have increased through collection of a modest additional monthly fee from alarm owners. Average costs to alarm owners have reduced due to reduced city alarm fines.
Scanning
The Salt Lake City Police Department (SLCPD) has struggled with the problem of false alarms for the past 20 years. False alarm calls were draining patrol resources and often created a significant backlog of calls. This problem had been apparent since 1980 when the department first began tracking false alarm statistics.
Police administrators were concerned that officers responding to alarm calls were getting increasingly complacent, knowing that 99 percent of alarm calls in Salt Lake City proved false. Complacency put officers checking buildings at risk. Moreover, officers risked injury just driving to alarm calls. Concern was partially based on the awareness that at least four officers in the United States and Canada had been killed in accidents responding to alarm calls in the past two years.
Stakeholders
The Salt Lake City Police Department identified taxpayers without alarm systems, alarm 2 Salt Lake City Police Department owners, alarm companies, city government and the police department as stakeholders in this problem. Stakeholders had different interests in the problem:
• Taxpayers without alarm systems were subsidizing the costs for police response to alarms, and those police resources were therefore not available to address other public needs.
• Alarm owners wanted a quick response to their alarm signal and wanted to minimize the costs they incurred from false alarm fines.
• City government tried to balance citizen welfare with consumption of municipal resources.
• The police department was interested in conserving resources by not responding to so many false alarms. They were also interested in ensuring that alarmed properties were adequately protected from burglary.
• Alarm companies were interested in maximizing their profit, which they believed they could do best by having police investigate alarm signals at public expense. Alarm companies' interests were summarized in a recent report on false alarms:
Alarm dealers view police as a gift to their business. They sell a system, charge monthly fees for managing effective response that is provided and paid by the general taxpayers. Dealers consider false activation to be an issue merely between the police and the customers. There is also little (apparent) interest by individual dealers to spend resources in order to solve their own and the communal problem.
i
The Impact of False Alarms on City Resources False alarms appeared to be a universal problem for police. Studies indicate that 97 to 99 percent of all alarm activations police respond to nationwide are false and they consume about 12 to 30 percent of patrol resources.i i Salt Lake City's false alarm problem did not appear to be unique. A number of important findings emerged from a local examination of the problem, including the following:
• In 1999, the Salt Lake City Police Department responded to 8,213 alarm activations. Only twenty-three cases, or three-tenths of one percent, of these calls justified a police report of any sort. Only a few of these reports were for actual burglaries.
• False alarm calls comprised 12 percent of all dispatched calls.
• Nearly $500,000 of the police department's budget (1.2%) was attributable to false alarms. The personnel time alone was the equivalent of five fulltime officers.
ii i This figure does not include the amount of time complaint takers and dispatchers spent handling incoming alarm activations and the 2,100 canceled false alarm calls for 1999.
• $150,000 in alarm fines was collected in 1999, which only partially offset the costs of alarm response, creating a net deficit of about $350,000. Alarm permits were required, but were free of charge. (The SLCPD did not support charging for alarm permits because it created an unwritten promise that police would respond on alarm activations.)
• Processing alarm permits and false alarm fines and adjudicating appeals created a significant workload for the police department alarm unit, the city treasurer's office, and the small claims court of appeals.
• All taxpayers, regardless of whether they had alarm systems or not, were subsidizing alarm response for the 12 percent of the city's residences and businesses with alarms.
• The average response time to an alarm activation was 40 minutes. Occasionally, alarm response took as long as two-and-a-half hours. Some aggressive alarm sales representatives were making false and unrealistic promises to their customers about how quickly the police would respond to alarms. Due to the tremendous number of alarm activations and the number of false alarms, the priority for alarm activations was downgraded in 1992 to preserve resources for higher priority calls for service such as domestic violence.
• Locally, alarm owners expressed frustration over false alarms and the consequent fines. They vented their frustration at both the police department and their alarm companies. Sixty percent of the phone calls received by the police department's alarm unit were from frustrated citizens.
• False alarms in Salt Lake City had three main causes: user errors due to insufficient training;i v inadequate verification by alarm company monitoring stations; and improper installation, inferior equipment and application at the alarm site.
Analysis
Part I: Available Alternatives and Current Response As early as 1980, Salt Lake City officials realized that preventive measures were needed to reduce false alarms. The city adopted a false alarm ordinance in 1981 that required a Traditional Regulatory Ordinance permit, established fines for false alarms that Of the reduction efforts examined by exceeded specified limits, and required the SLCPD, the most common was the regulatoalarm owner to disconnect the alarm after ry ordinance, consisting of processing perexcessive false alarms. There were no means mits, warning letters, a certain number of to enforce the disconnection provision, how-"free" false alarm responses, fines, and susever. In 1994, a more stringent alarm ordi-pension of police response to alarm systems nance was adopted allowing four "free" with excessive false alarms, false alarms and charging a $100 fine on the fifth alarm. Alarm owners were charged Salt Lake City Police Department even for false alarms caused by faulty equip-adopted this approach in 1981. This ordiment or faulty alarm installation. This 1994 nance attempted to manage the problem, but ordinance resulted in a 16 percent decrease had no significant long-term impact on in false alarms in the first year after it was reduction. It was very labor intensive for the adopted. However, the following year false alarm unit and the treasury department, and alarms increased by 13 percent.
required an extensive software program.
With four "free" alarms, alarm owners were These ordinances were only margin-often negligent about solving the problem ally effective, and, considering the rising until the fifth alarm was imminent. Alarm number of new alarm owners, the permit owners placed on suspension received no and fine approaches were like putting a fin-response to their alarm from the police ger in the dam to stop the flooding. These department and usually had not selected an responses helped manage, but did not solve, alternate provider to do so. Thus, when their the false alarm problem. alarm signaled, no response was forthcoming. Suspension provisions in this traditionAlternative Responses to False Alarms al ordinance dealt with the chronic false The SLCPD researched other police depart-alarm abuser. However, new alarm owners ments' efforts to manage their false alarm who were poorly trained and unfamiliar problems, and found everything from small-with the use of their alarm system caused er jurisdictions doing nothing to larger juris-the bulk of false alarms. The fines seemed dictions dedicating up to 12 employees to punitive to citizens, complaints were vigordeal with false alarms. Police officers were ous, and most alarm owners blamed their being utilized for a variety of tasks, such as alarm company for their false alarms, inspecting alarm systems and hanging notices on citizens' doors to increase aware-Cost Recovery ness of the problem. Alarm unit staff were This method requires a permit with an annubilling and tracking false alarms, and spon-al renewal fee and is very labor intensive for soring false alarm awareness courses. the alarm unit, generally requiring additionDespite intense efforts by many police al personnel. There are usually no suspendepartments, alarm rates persisted at over 97 sion features and police continue to respond percent false and alarm calls constituted to all alarm signals. In order to recover all from 12 to 30 percent of total dispatched costs of patrol response under this alarm calls for police service.
response approach, the SCLPD would have to significantly increase fees, imposing a Salt Lake City examined the follow-financial burden on many alarm owners, ing false alarm reduction efforts attempted Further, the police department would not in other agencies:
likely retain the monies from alarm response, as fee revenue would go directly to the municipality's general fund.
Alarm Industry Regulatory methods, the SLCPD officers gathered that This seldom-used false alarm reduction this method merely manages the problem effort requires the alarm company to collect and does not solve it. false alarm fines from their customers and remit the revenue to the city. For example, Conclusions from Alternative Response The City of Toronto, Ontario charges $73 for Analysis every alarm call coming into the communi-The Salt Lake City Police Department's cations center. Alarm companies typically attempt to manage false alarms with ordiresist this approach, even to the point of nances consisting of warnings, fines, and threatening legal challenges.
permits had no significant long-term effect and only minimal short-term effect on the Another regulatory strategy has overall reduction of alarm activations or the police agencies attempting to restrict the percentage of false alarms. Nearly all alarm alarm monitoring stations' actions. It activations were false and the current system requires the alarm monitor to place a tele-was yielding slow police response times that phone call to the alarm site to determine if were of little value to either the police or the alarm signal was in error and whether alarm owners. The probability of catching the person who answered the telephone burglars in the act after 40 minutes was slim, knew the pass code. Another approach Even the alarm industry did not believe that requires the monitoring company to receive police response added much value, signals from two different alarm zones Members of the Utah Alarm Association before requesting a police dispatch. Alarm conceded to police that they believed signs monitoring stations are not necessarily locat-and stickers posted on the premise indicated in the same city as the customers they ing an alarm system provided far greater serve. They may be located hundreds of deterrent value than the value of a police miles away, deal with thousands of police response. The public costs of the current sysdepartments, and answer alarm signals for tem far exceed the revenues recovered in millions of alarm customers. Each police fines. Continuing to waste police resources jurisdiction may require different specifica-was not in the best interest of public safety, tions for alarm response, but that does not mean the monitoring company will comply.
The SLCPD concluded that police It is difficult for a police department in response to an alarm signal only made sense California, for example, to try to dictate an if some eyewitness could first verify the approach to alarm response to a monitoring validity of the alarm signal. Private security company in Florida. The Salt Lake City guards were a logical fit for this role. The police department were aware of at least one police department further concluded that monitoring company that refuses to cancel a the initial verification of alarm activation request for a police dispatch if the dispatch was a private sector responsibility, has aged more than 15 minutes, even if the Consequently, Salt Lake City began to alarm owner can verify the alarm is in error. explore the feasibility of shifting the primary responsibility for verifying alarms signals Outsourcing Collection Agency from the police to the private alarm and In this approach, the police department security companies. This practice is termed responds to alarm calls, but the administra-"verified response." tive tasks of issuing permits, sending out fine notices, and collecting fines is contract-Part II:
The Feasibility of Verified ed to a private firm. Usually, the private firm Response in Salt Lake City returns a small percentage of the fines col-To explore the feasibility of implementing lected to the municipality. As with other verified response, the SLCPD alarm unit began a campaign to increase alarm owners' Department's alarm unit examined costs awareness that they could contract first associated with verified response and conresponse to their alarm signal with a private cluded that private alarm companies could guard company. Most alarm owners were feasibly recover the costs of responding to otherwise unaware of this option. The first alarms from their customers. When West step was to include a listing of private guard Valley City (located eight miles to the west of services in the mailing with all new alarm Salt Lake City, population 100,000) adopted permits issued in 1998 and 1999. The num-their verified response policy in May 2000, ber of false alarms decreased by 7 percent alarm companies operating in that commufrom 1998 to 1999, perhaps partially due to nity began charging their customers an addioffering alarm owners this private response tional $5 per month to cover the cost of prioption. Indeed, many alarm owners com-vate guard response, mented that they appreciated having the option of paying for the less expensive servTo gauge availability of private ices of a private guard responder instead of guards responding to alarm activations, the paying false alarm fines to the city. Alarm police department sent a survey to all priowners also informed the SCLPD that they vate guard firms listed in the Salt Lake City didn't want the department's officers wast-telephone directory. The survey asked if the ing time on false alarm calls. Such comments firms would be interested in responding to reflected a preference among citizens that burglar alarms and, if so, what they estimatthe city's officers be made available for ed their average response time would be. response to genuine emergency calls.
Nine companies responded positively, with estimates of average response times ranging The alarm unit concluded that alarm from three to 15 minutes. As noted by severownership is a private, personal choice, not al researchers, "Already private security mandated by law, the city, or the police guards fulfill most security functions and department. An examination of verified they number more than three times the total response implementation in agencies in Las number of federal, state, and local law Vegas and Henderson, Nevada; Lane enforcement personnel." v County, Oregon; and West Valley City and Taylorsville, Utah, found no legal challenges On the basis of the research, the to these verified response ordinances and SLCPD concluded that enough private secupolicies. According to the Salt Lake City rity companies were willing and able to Attorney's Office, "Law enforcement did not respond to alarm signal activations and that have a legal liability to respond to alarms a verified response policy was indeed feasiand the alarm contract is a civil contract ble. between two private entities." v An article on verified response in the Las Vegas Metro Response Police Department concluded:
In May 2000, the Salt Lake City Police The police have no legal responsiDepartment proposed a new ordinance to bility to respond to any given situthe city council. The major elements of the ation unless mandated by local proposed verified response alarm ordinance law. Litigation aimed at forcing were: response compliance is unlikely to succeed because this law is so
• In all alarm activations, eyewitness clearly stated and so well underverification of suspicious activity is stood by judiciaries.v i required of alarm company personnel or a private guard prior to police Members of the Salt Lake City Police department notification.
• Continued police response to human-the proposed policy, activated alarms such as robbery, panic and duress vi ii alarm signals. The The department approached the local first false alarm of these types incurs a alarm companies again to present the pro-$50 fine, with subsequent fines based posed verified response policy. Salt Lake on an escalating fine structure.
City and several other local police agencies had been meeting with some of the alarm • Alarm owners participation in a false companies and members of the Utah Alarm alarm prevention course in lieu of one Association for the past five years, so the false alarm fine per year. industry was familiar with the verified response concept. One of the Utah Alarm • False alarms that are caused by the Association's early objections to verified alarm company technician charged to response was the cost to alarm companies of the alarm company rather than the responding to and investigating false alarm owner. alarms. This concern was addressed when alarm companies realized they could pay for The police department realized that this added service by charging alarm owners educating citizens, business owners, and the a modest, additional $5 monthly fee. One city council on false alarm issues would be alarm company even allowed their cuscrucial to passage of the verified response tomers three "free" responses before chargalarm ordinance. Police encounters with cit-ing a fee. izens had revealed many misperceptions of the police resources and taxpayer monies
The Salt Lake City Police Department involved in false alarm response. The city offered a three-hour training course to all council members were astonished to learn of state licensed guard companies. Improving the high percentage of false alarm calls.
cooperation between police and the private guard sector was one of the goals of this Salt Lake City police contacted local training. The training stressed that the pritelevision stations and newspapers to vate guards' role was only to observe and briefed them on the proposed policy and the report at the alarm activation scene, and not rationale behind it. All were willing to cover to enter or search the building or try to the story and most reported favorably on the apprehend offenders. Guards were instructproposed policy.
ed that, if they discovered an open door, they were to contact the police department Upon hearing of the proposed policy, and not enter the premise. A call from a some citizens called the alarm unit to guard discovering an open door, broken express concern. When alarm unit staff window or any criminal activity would explained that the public would receive result in a "possible burglary in progress" faster response to their alarm activation call -a top priority call. Other subjects covfrom the private guard service than they ered in the training included safety tactics, could expect from the police, would pay a initial approach, cover and concealment, small fee rather than the $100 ordinance crime scene containment, and suspect identifines, and, if the alarm was valid, would fication. One of the most popular subjects experience faster police response than they was the review of Utah state statutes and had in the past, a vast majority of the citizens codes governing the elements of the crimes became supportive of the ordinance. In the of burglary and criminal trespass, and laws first month after the news stories broke, governing private guards' authority to use SLCPD received more than 100 phone calls, force to arrest and defend themselves and with only two callers remaining opposed to others.
The Salt Lake City Police Department attorney reviewed and approved the lesson materials.
A public hearing was scheduled one month after the initial briefing to give the alarm industry sufficient time to participate in the discussions involving the proposed ordinance changes. Police administrators briefed the city council on false alarm issues. The police union president wrote a strong letter of support for the verified response ordinance to the city council.
The ordinance was passed by the city council on a 4-2 vote on September 12, 2000. Some of the comments from city council members were: upcoming changes. The police department provided a list of nine state-licensed and bonded guard companies to those alarm companies that needed to subcontract with guard companies in order to respond to alarm activations. The ordinance took effect December 1, 2000.
Certified letters were sent to all alarm and monitoring companies to inform them of the changes. In order to reach all citizens of Salt Lake City, an article explaining the drain on police resources caused by false alarms and the new requirements for private guard response was included in two issues of the water bill. This was an efficient way to reach all affected citizens.
The better argument supports taking the resources now being used to address situations which were not of the highest priority and use them to address needs of a higher priority.
No matter what side a person was on, it was an undisputed fact that there is a 99 percent false factor involved in alarm system calls. There is not a program in the City which, if only 1 percent effective, would survive scrutiny for even a moment. If properly implemented, an appropriate method of having security companies show up made a lot of sense. This would free up officers to do what they were supposed to do. The police department was not asking to change the ordinance because they did not want to serve the citizens; they were asking to change it because it was not effective and did not work.
The city council further decreed that the ordinance would take effect three months after it was enacted to allow the alarm companies time to mobilize their private guards and educate the public on the
Assessment
Benefits to the Police Department The Salt Lake City Police Department experienced a 90 percent decrease in alarm-related calls for service during the first nine months the verified response ordinance was in effect, from December 1, 2000 to August 1, 2001, compared to the same time frame one year prior (see Figure 1 ). This represents 6,338 fewer calls for service, or the equivalent of five full-time police officers (valued at about $400,000). This time and money is now available for higher priority police services. There are fewer backlogs of calls for service and responses to high priority calls for service robbery, panic or duress signals. have dropped from five to three minutes. Said Salt Lake City Watch Commander Zane Benefits to the Alarm Industry Smith, "In the first three months of enforce-Under verified response, the alarm can now ment, this alarm ordinance has returned provide their customers with a valued quick more patrol hours to our department and response to alarm activations. They can also helped to decrease the backlog of calls better redirect time and effort into serving their than anything attempted in the past 15 customers rather than trying to appease years." There has been a corresponding police. Some alarm companies have actually decrease in the workload of police call takers increased their revenue from the additional and dispatchers, the alarm unit, the city monthly fees charged to customers. treasury department, and the court of appeals. Today, the probability that a crime Verified response has shifted the has in fact occurred when police are called to management of the false alarm problem an alarm activation is much higher.
from the police to alarm owners and the alarm companies they hire. Economic supInitially, alarm company spokesper-ply and demand will now govern the delivsons said they believed that burglaries in the ery and cost of private security responses to city would increase when police ceased to alarm activations. If a guard company's perbecome the first responders to the alarm sig-formance proves unsatisfactory, the compenal. Thus far, this has not proven to be the tition will provide another company to take case in Salt Lake City. The number of burgla-its place. Alarm company representatives ries have remained consistent over the past indicated that their sales have not been two years, and have decreased by 24 percent impacted by the shift to private guard from burglaries in 1998. Passage of the ordi-response. Citizens are continuing to purnance on December 1, 2000 made no signifi-chase alarm systems, cant impact on the number of burglaries (see Figure 1) .
Salt Lake City's verified response alarm ordinance is a long-term solution to Six burglars were arrested by police the false alarm problem, a problem that the as a result of private security guards' department had been struggling with for response to alarms on 720 police responses twenty years. By no longer attempting to during the first nine months of the ordinance manage a private sector problem, the Salt enactment. By comparison, in 1999, prior to Lake City Police Department believes is has adoption of verified response, only five bur-solved its false alarm problem, glars were arrested on 10,200 police responses to alarm signals.
End notes i Erwin Blackstone, Simon Hakim and Benefits to Alarm Owners Uriel Spiegel. "Government Competes and The benefits of verified response to alarm Retreats, Public Gains: owners include a six-to fifteen-minute alarm Shedding Police Response to Burglar activation response time from private guard Alarms." January 23, 2001. Center for companies, far lower than the 40-minute Competitive Government at Temple average the police were able to provide. University: Philadelphia, Pa. Further benefits include lower monthly fees than most alarm owners were paying in ii Jennifer Seelig. "Salt Lake City fines for false alarms and continued police Council Office Audit on Comparable Cities response to human-activated alarms such as Alarm Policies and Response." 20 July 2000. iii Each alarm call requires two officers for an average half hour on each alarm call at an average wage of $60 per hour. This figure includes salary, benefits, and the amortized costs of the police car, computer and equipment.
iv Commercial intrusion alarms accounted for two-and-a-half times the number of residential alarms, mostly due to employees who did not have or remember the alarm code, and to cleaning crews inadvertently setting off the alarm while working. Residential alarms tend to be activated by children and relatives who do not know how to use the alarm system, and by the motion of pets, insects, ceiling fans, and even floating balloons. The National and Burglar Alarm Association calculate that 76 percent of alarm activations are caused by user error. viii "Duress" alarm signals occur when a code is entered that indicates the operator is not deactivating the alarm voluntarily.
